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Abstract—We investigate deep learning based omni intrusion
detection system (IDS) for supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) networks that are capable of detecting both
temporally uncorrelated and correlated attacks. Regarding the
IDSs developed in this paper, a feedforward neural network
(FNN) can detect temporally uncorrelated attacks at an F1 of
99.967±0.005% but correlated attacks as low as 58±2%. In
contrast, long-short term memory (LSTM) detects correlated
attacks at 99.56±0.01% while uncorrelated attacks at 99.3±0.1%.
Combining LSTM and FNN through an ensemble approach
further improves the IDS performance with F1 of 99.68±0.04%
regardless the temporal correlations among the data packets.
Index Terms—Feedforward Neural Networks, Multilayer Per-
ceptron, Intrusion detection, Network security, SCADA systems,
Supervised learning, LSTM, IDS, Modbus, Denial of Service
(DoS).
I. INTRODUCTION
SUPERVISORY control and data acquisition (SCADA) isa well established industrial system to automate/monitor
processes and to gather data from remote or local equip-
ment such as programmable logic controller (PLC), remote
terminal units (RTU) and human-machine-interfaces (HMI),
etc. SCADA became popular in the 60’s for power plants,
water treatment [1], and oil pipelines [2], etc., which were
usually disconnected from the Internet and made use of
hardware devices running proprietary protocols. The network
was secured from harmful attacks because of its obscurity,
thus security means were barely implemented. However, as
more and more SCADA systems are adopting its Modbus
protocol over TCP and are accessible via the Internet, they are
vulnerable to cyberattacks. In 2010, Stuxnet [3] was spread
over the world and damaged Iranian nuclear power plants.
Since then, the need for industrial network security became
urgent.
To safeguard SCADA networks, an intrusion detection sys-
tem (IDS) needs to be implemented. IDS can be signature-
based or anomaly-based. Traditionally, signature-based IDS is
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the mainstream to detect SCADA attacks. It identifies specific
patterns from traffic data to detect the malicious activities
and can be implemented as policy rules in IDS software
such as Snort [4], [5]. Ref. [6] investigates a set of attacks
against Modbus and designs rules to detect attacks. Ref. [7]
proposes a state-relation-based IDS (SRID) to increase the
accuracy and decrease the false negative rate in denial-of-
service (DoS) detection. However, these detection methods are
too complicated and only valid for specific scenarios. Overall,
as discovered in the previous research, signature based IDS
is only efficient at finding known attacks and its performance
relies heavily on the experts’ knowledge and experiences.
An anomaly-based IDS [8] overcomes these challenges by
introducing machine learning to identify attack patterns from
data. It is also widely used in other applications such as
mobile data misuse detection [9], software [10] and wireless
sensor security [11]. Several machine learning algorithms are
proposed to develop anomaly-based IDS. Linda et al. [12]
tailored a neural network model with error-back propagation
and Levenberg-Marquardt learning rules in their IDS. Rrushi
and Kang [13] combined logistic regression and maximum
likelihood estimation to detect anomalies in process control
networks. Poojitha et al. [14] trained a feedforward neural
network (FNN) to classify intrusions on the KDD99 dataset
and the industrial control system dataset. Zhang et al. [15]
used support vector machine and artificial immune system to
identify malicious network traffic in the smart grid. Maglaras
and Jiang [16] developed a one-class support vector machine
module to train network traces off-line and detect intrusions
on-line. All these machine learning algorithms are excellent in
observing the pattern of attacks from the in-packet features.
None of them, however, takes into account of the temporal
features between packets and thus will not perform well on
attacks such as DoS which has strong temporal dependence.
DoS attacks are among the most popular attacks to slow
down or even crush the SCADA networks. Most of the devices
in SCADA operate in low power mode with limited capacity
and are vulnerable to DoS [17]. Up to date, various DoS
types, including spoofing [18], flooding and smurfing [19],
etc., have been reported. Among all types of DoS, flooding
DoS is widely-exploited where hackers send a massive number
of packets to jam the target network. In [20], the author
exploits TCP syn flooding attack against the vulnerability of
TCP transmission using hping DoS attack tool. Flooding DoS,
along with all other DoS, is difficult to detect because the
in-packet features extracted from each data packet may not
display any suspicious pattern [21].
Similar to DoS, man-in-the-middle (MITM) is another
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2attack that is hard to detect from observing the in-packet
features. It will be more efficient to detect them by observing
the inter-packet patterns in time domain.
Anomaly-based IDS on DoS and MITM becomes popular
along with the advances of machine learning. For example,
in [22], an auto-associative kernel regression (AAKR) coupled
with the statistical probability ratio test (SPRT) is implemented
to detect DoS. The result is not satisfactory because the
regression model does not take the temporal signatures of DoS
into consideration. In [23], FNN is used to classify abnor-
mal packets in SCADA with 85% accuray for MITM-based
random response injection and 90% accuracy for DoS-based
random response injection attacks but 12% at Replay-based
attacks. The author exploits various attacks including DoS
attacks and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in the testbed
built in Modbus/RTU instead of Modbus/TCP. In [24], the
authors propose one-class support vector machine (OCSVM)
combined with k-means clustering method to detect the DoS.
They set flags on every 10 packets to reflect the relationships
of time series. But the handcrafted features may be easily by-
passed by expert attackers.
To detect temporally correlated attacks such as flooding DoS
and MITM, one should capture the temporal anomaly from
these attacks. However, those above mentioned IDS are not
designed to extract temporal patterns from packets sequence.
A more practical approach is to implement an IDS with the
capacity of time series analysis.
Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are the machine learning
models that incorporate the recognition of temporal patterns.
Among all RNN models, long short-term memory (LSTM)
gains its popularity from speech recognition [25], music com-
position [26] and to machine translation [27]. It is designed
to predict future events according to the information in the
previous time steps and suitable for detecting attacks with
temporal correlation. For example, Ref. [28] applied LSTM for
distributed DoS with high success rate. In [29] the authors also
developed a time-series anomaly detector based on LSTM [30]
networks to enhance the performance of IDS and apply this
framework to the dataset in [31]. But the number of DoS
attacks in the dataset is relatively small and the time interval
for the DoS attack in this dataset is too long, making the
detection inefficient.
Despite of the excellent performance in detecting temporally
correlated attacks such as DoS and MITM, the capacity of
RNN to detect temporally uncorrelated attacks is limited
compared to other types of machine learning algorithms such
as FNN. In this paper, utilizing the advantages of both RNN
and FNN while avoiding their disadvantages, we implement
an omni IDS that can detect all attacks regardless of their
temporal dependence. On a SCADA testbed [17], we demon-
strate that our IDS reaches the highest performance against all
attacks compared to those that employ RNN or FNN alone.
II. SCADA TESTBED AND DATA SYNTHESIZE
Our IDS is tested on a simulated SCADA testbed. A
simulated network has the advantage of being easy to maintain,
change and operate and is less costly than a real device
network. A software testbed, which simulates a SCADA
industry network and emulates the attacks was built by L.
Zhang [17] on the basis work of T. Morris [32]. In the past,
several preliminary researches on SCADA security had been
conducted on this testbed [33], [34]. The attack target is a sim-
ple SCADA network, consisting of two tanks using Modbus
over TCP. The liquid level of the tanks is controlled by pumps
and measured by sensors via Modbus control information. The
purpose of this network is to attract hackers and study possible
defense methods. Such a system is called Honeypot, as it fools
the attacker while exploiting his behaviour. This tank system
is developed by the MBLogic HMIBuilder and HMIServer
toolkit [35] and has been extended by L. Zhang in [17]. The
HMI’s purpose is to pull data from the sensor or send the
desired pump speed to the motor periodically. The back end
of the HMI is a PLC while the front end is a web browser.
As this system is simulated, we make use of four virtual
machines as shown in Fig. 1. The SCADA system runs
on a Modbus master and several slaves. On a virtual host
called Nova the HMI is deployed, thus we refer to this host
as Modbus master. In order to extend the network, some
Modbus slaves such as PLCs are simulated by the HoneyD
software [36]. This will provide a more realistic Honeypot.
The role of a Modbus slave is to process commands from the
master by pulling sensory data about the tank system from the
PLCs and sending it back to the master.
Fig. 1: Testbed architecture [17]
The data needed to feed the neural network is generated
by an attack machine using a virtual host named Kali. Kali
is a Debian-derived Linux host used for penetration testing
and features many attack and defense tools. Additional to the
message exchange between the Modbus master (Nova) and its
slaves we can launch normal traffic mixed with various attacks
from Kali. A command line tool, Modpoll [37], is used to
send Modbus instructions to the PLC which controls sensible
tank system variables. An example Modpoll instruction which
sends a pump speed of 5 to the system looks like this:
$ modpol l −0 −r 32210 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 5 5
The command addresses a simulated PLC with an IP address
of 10.0.0.5 and a register address which contains either a
threshold value (register 42212 - 42215), the current pump
speed (32210) or the tank level (42210,42211), measured by
the sensors. Modpoll will send Modbus requests with function
3code 16 to attempt a write action to the specified registers.
By modifying the pump speed the attackers can exceed the
allowed tank level and create serious damage to a system. A
script on Kali will randomly choose between these normal
or malicious Modbus instructions and will launch a Modpoll
instruction with another randomly chosen parameter. This will
ensure desired distribution of attack/non-attack data.
The traffic will be recorded by the fourth virtual machine
referred to as “Defense Wall”, which operates in the bridge
mode and thus is invisible to the attacker. With PyShark
we capture the traffic between Nova and Modbus slaves and
between the attacker machine Kali and the PLCs. During this
process we can label each packet as malicious or normal.
A. Features extracted from the data packets
In our testbed, we use a self-developed IDS installed on
“Defense Wall” to extract 19 features from each data packet
captured. They are listed below:
1) Source IP address;
2) Destination IP address;
3) Source port number;
4) Destination port number;
5) TCP sequence number;
6) Transaction identifier set by the client to uniquely iden-
tify each request;
7) Function code identify the Modbus function used;
8) Reference number of the specified register;
9) Modbus register data;
10) Modbus exception code;
11) Time stamp;
12) Relative time;
13) Highest threshold;
14) Lowest threshold;
15) High threshold;
16) Low threshold;
17) Pump speed;
18) Tank 1 water level;
19) Tank 2 water level.
Here, the “Relative time” represents the time in seconds for
packets relative to the first packet in the same TCP session.
To reduce the periodicity of this feature, we reset it to zero
when “Relative time” reaches 3,000 seconds.
In our IDS, we adopt feature scaling of each feature x in
the dataset according to
x′ =
x− x¯
σx
(1)
where x¯ and σx are the mean and standard deviation of original
feature x and x′ is the re-scaled feature from x with zero mean
and unity variance.
B. Types of attacks in our datasets
Using our scripts, we created two datasets. As illustrated
in Fig. 2, in addition to “Normal” data packets, Dataset I
contains attacks that are uncorrelated in time domain while
Dataset II contains temporally dependent attacks. Here we
have incorporated 10 attacks in our testbed. 7 of them are
Fig. 2: Data packet types distribution in Dataset I, II and
online script. The ones with a superscript “*” are temporally
correlated attacks.
temporally uncorrelated while the remaining 3 are correlated.
The temporally uncorrelated attacks include “Pump Speed”
(Pump), “Tank 1 Level” (T1), “Tank 2 Level” (T2), “Threshold
Highest” (HH), “Threshold Lowest” (LL), “Threshold High”
(H) and “Threshold Low” (L) whose detailed descriptions can
be found in [17], [32].
Among all temporally correlated attacks, two types of
flooding DoS attacks are included [31]. The first labelled as
“Scan flooding” (SCAN) is to send massive scan command,
resulting in increasing latency of communications between the
HMI and the sensors in SCADA. The second type labelled
as “Incorrect CRC” (CRC) is sending massive packets with
incorrect cyclic redundancy check (CRC) to cause latency of
master.
Another temporally correlated attack included in this testbed
is “Man-in-the-middle” (MITM) attack. It is an eavesdropping
where the attacker monitors the communication traffics be-
tween two parties secretly. Here, the MITM attack is launched
by Ettercap [38] using ARP spoofing [39]. One effective
way to detect ARP spoofing is identifying the Media Access
Control (MAC) address in layer 2 of OSI model. However,
most of Network IDSs (NIDS) do not support the protocols
in layer 2 such as ARP and MAC protocols. Even Snort
requires an ARP spoof preprocessor [40] to collect the MAC
address information to detect ARP spoofing. Besides, the
victim host of ARP spoofing attack would experience packets
retransmissions. For SCADA networks, packet retrasmissions
or delay may cause great damages. Therefore, the IDS should
raise alert when it detects either MITM attack or packets
retransmissions. To make the IDS robust in detecting both
MITM and packets retransmissions we remove the MAC
address feature which was used for labeling MITM attack from
the datasets for training neural networks.
At the first stage, FNN and LSTM IDSs will be trained
as binary classifiers that only predict attacks from normal
traffic and tested on these datasets separately for performance
comparisons. In on-line phases, these two IDSs along with
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Fig. 3: (a)The schematics of the FNN IDS (b) Details of each
neuron in FNN
our FNN-LSTM ensemble IDS will be trained as multi-class
classifiers by the combined datasets to predict various types of
attacks from normal traffics and implemented on the testbed. In
addition, we also implement a script that can launch realtime
attacks for online testing. The online script will randomly
launch normal traffic, temporally uncorrelated and correlated
attacks with ratios shown in the table to examine the omni-
detection capability of different IDSs.
III. IDS IMPLEMENTATION
In this paper, we implemented three IDSs: a conventional
FNN, a LSTM and a FNN-LSTM ensemble IDS. Here, we
use Keras [41] to implement tensorflow [42] based machine
learning models with AdamOptimizer [43] to train our model.
The structure of these IDSs are detailed in the following
subsections.
A. FNN IDS
The basic structure of the FNN IDS is illustrated in Fig. 3.
A typical FNN is formed by an input layer, an output layer
and one or more hidden layers in-between. Each layer has
a number of neurons that use the neuron outputs from the
previous layer as input and produces output to the neurons in
next layer. In our case, inputs are the scaled and normalized
features extracted from the data packets, and outputs are the
predictions of attacks and normal events. Mathematically, the
FNN can be expressed as:
z(1) = W(1)x + b(1),h1 = fh(z(1))
z(2) = W(2)h1 + b(2),h2 = fh(z(2))
...
z(N+1) = W(N+1)hN + b(N+1), yˆ = z(N+1)
(2)
where N is the number of hidden layers, fh is the
ReLU activation function, and W(1),W(2), ...,W(N+1),
b(1),b(2), ...,b(N+1) are the parameters to be trained. Here
we use softmax cross entropy as our loss function, which can
be expressed as
fL(yˆ, y) = −
C∑
i=1
yi log(fs(yˆi)) (3)
where yˆ is the predicted label and y the ground truth. C is the
number of all possible classes, yi and yˆi are the actual and
predicted labels that belongs to class i, and fs is the softmax
function.
B. LSTM IDS
The LSTM is built on a collection of single LSTM
cells [31]. The structure of single LSTM cells is as Fig. 4a.
Each LSTM cell has 3 gates: input gate, forget gate and output
gate. The input gate selects useful information and push it to
the cell. The irrelevant information will be discarded in forget
gate. The output gate outputs the activation state ot. A hidden
state vector ht is transferred to the next time steps.
The following equations represent the processes of a single
LSTM cell:
ft = σ(Wfxt + Ufht−1 + bf )
it = σ(Wixt + Uiht−1 + bi)
ot = σ(Woxt + Uoht−1 + bo)
ct = ft ◦ ct−1 + it ◦ σg(Wcxt + Ucht−1 + bc)
ht = ot ◦ σg(ct)
(4)
where σg is hyperbolic tangent function and σ is sigmoid
function. ◦ is the element-wise product notation. W , U , b are
the weight matrix for the gates.
Shown in Fig. 4b, the LSTM IDS includes two LSTM
layers with 10 LSTM cells in each layer. An activation layer
with sigmoid activation function is placed after the last LSTM
layer. The {x1, x2, ..., xt} vector is the input vector containing
features of packets within t time steps. The dataset is reshaped
in this format and fit into the LSTM model. In our model, we
set t = 10. The loss function in this model is binary cross
entropy and the optimizer is Adam optimizer [44].
C. FNN-LSTM Ensemble IDS
Our FNN-LSTM ensemble IDS aims to combine the ad-
vantages of both FNN and LSTM while avoiding their weak-
nesses [45]. The schematics of this model is as shown in
Fig. 8. In this model, the data packet features are fed into
FNN and LSTM simultaneously to predict attacks as a multi-
class classifier. The output labels of both are concatenated as
the input of a multilayer perceptron, which through training,
is capable of voting for the best prediction of the data packet
under investigation.
5(a)
(b)
Fig. 4: The structure of (a) single LSTM cell, (b) LSTM
Network.
Fig. 5: Ensemble Model.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT
To demonstrate their capability for detecting attacks with-
/without temporal correlation, we first implement FNN and
LSTM IDSs to establish references for comparison. At this
stage, the IDSs only conduct binary classification to predict if
TABLE I: Comparison of the temporally-uncorrelated-attacks
detection.
Precision Recall F1
FNN 99.996±0.006 99.84±0.05 99.92±0.03
LSTM 99.88±0.06 98.7±0.4 99.3±0.1
the data packet under investigation is normal (labeled as “0”)
or attack (labeled as “1”). Consequently, sigmoid function
σ(z) =
ez
1 + ez
(5)
is selected as the activation function. Here, z is the output of
the previous LSTM layer.
A. Hyper parameters tuning
Both IDSs are trained using 70% of the randomly chosen
samples from the two datasets and tested with the remaining
30% samples following the 10-fold training/testing procedure
so that the average and standard deviation of figures of merits
including precision, recall and F1 can be used for evaluation.
To determine the number of hidden layers necessary for
our FNN, we computed F1 with 0, 1 and 2 hidden layers
where the values of 99.22%, 99.96% and 99.97% are obtained
respectively. As shown, employing 1 hidden layers in FNN
will increase the F1 by more than 7% while using 2 hidden
layers the improvement is minimal. Therefore, we select 1
hidden layer in our FNN implementation.
In addition, to circumvent overfitting, we further adopted
early stop procedure in FNN such that the optimization stops
when the number of epochs whose relative differences of loss
between consecutive ones are less than 10−6 reaches 35 [46].
Similarly, LSTM adopts early stop if either maximum epochs
reach 3.
In implementation of LSTM, we connect 10 LSTM cells
in input layer where the features from 10 consecutive data
packets are entered into the cells to predict if the last packet
is normal or an attack. In training, we adopt mini-batch with
a batch size of 1, 000.
B. Detection of temporally uncorrelated attacks
We exploit the Dataset I described in Section II to compare
the detection capability of FNN and LSTM for temporally
uncorrelated attacks. To verify the models, learning curves
are plotted in Fig. 6 where training and testing losses as a
function of training samples are plotted. Here the average
value and standard deviation after 10 fold training/testing are
represented by circle markers and error bars respectively. As
shown, with training samples exceeding 40,000, FNN training
and testing losses (blue dashed lines) start to converge while
LSTM (red solid lines) converges at sample size larger than
60,000. Overall, it confirms that the number of samples in
Dataset I is sufficient for the training and testing of our IDS.
After the IDSs are trained, we use 30% of samples in
Dataset I for 10 fold testing. Also shown in Table II and I, on
average, for FNN, only 0.6 of the 69,846 normal datapackets
are mislabelled as attacks while only 30.7 out of 19,771
6Fig. 6: Learning Curves of FNN and LSTM using temporally-
uncorrelated-attacks dataset (Dataset I).
TABLE II: Confusion matrices of temporally-uncorrelated-
attacks detection using Dataset I (averaged over 10 trials)
Predicted
Normal Attacks
A
ct
ua
l Normal
FNN 69, 845.4 0.6
LSTM 69, 902.2 22.8
Attacks
FNN 30.7 19, 741.3
LSTM 241.9 19, 448.1
TABLE III: Comparison of temporally correlated attacks (%)
Precision Recall F1
FNN 73±2 49±4 58±2
LSTM 99.60±0.01 99.52±0.02 99.56±0.01
TABLE IV: Confusion matrix of temporally correlated attacks
Predicted
Normal Attacks
A
ct
ua
l Normal
FNN 28, 668.3 5, 044.7
LSTM 33, 504.0 105.0
Attacks
FNN 13, 510.4 13, 169.6
LSTM 128.4 26, 652.6
actual attacks are mislabelled as normal traffic, yielding the
precision, recall and F1 to be 99.996±0.006%, 99.84±0.05%,
and 99.92±0.03%. In comparison, LSTM mislabelled 22.8
normal packets as attacks and 241.9 attacks as normal packets,
resulting the figures of merits to be 99.88±0.06%, 98.7±0.4%
and 99.3±0.1%. The comparison demonstrates that FNN out-
performed LSTM in detecting temporally uncorrelated attacks
where recognition of the in-packet feature patterns is critical.
C. Detection of temporally correlated attacks
In this subsection FNN and LSTM are re-trained and tested
using Dataset II for comparison of their temporally correlated
attacks detection comparison. Again the learning curves in
Fig. 7: Learning Curves of FNN and LSTM using temporally-
correlated-attacks dataset (Dataset II).
TABLE V: Macro-average comparison of omni-attacks detec-
tion
Precision Recall F1
FNN 88±1 89.2±0.8 87.4±0.6
LSTM 99.54±0.03 99.01±0.07 99.27±0.05
Ensemble 99.76±0.05 99.57±0.03 99.68±0.04
Fig. 8 shows that both FNN (blue dashed lines) and LSTM
(red solid lines) converge at training samples exceeding 10,000
while LSTM clearly shows lower testing loss. This confirms
the sufficiency of our dataset to generalize the IDS models.
The performance of each model is compared in Table III
and IV. As shown, FNN is inefficient in detecting temporally
correlated attacks with precision, recall and F1 scores as
low as 73±2%, 49±4% and 58±2 respectively. In particular,
5,044.7 out of 33,713 normal packets are mislabelled to attacks
while 13,510.4 out of 26,680 actual attacks are mislabelled
to normal traffic. It is evident that the poor performance
of FNN is caused by its inability to inter-packet features.
In contrast, LSTM displays an outstanding performance on
the corresponding figures of merits to be 99.60±0.01%,
99.52±0.02% and 99.56±0.01% where only 105.0 normal
packets are mislabelled as attacks and 128.4 attacks packets are
mislabelled as normal traffic. As expected, LSTM outperforms
FNN in detecting temporally correlated attacks due to its
inherent nature to observe data pattern in time domain.
D. Omni attacks detection
Recognizing the mutual strength of FNN and LSTM IDSs
in detecting temporally correlated and uncorrelated attacks,
we here combine the advantages of both for an omni at-
tacks detector through ensemble approach. The structure of
FNN-LSTM ensemble is described in Subsection III-C. To
implement, we first remodelled FNN and LSTM to multi-
class classifiers so that different attacks can be distinguished.
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Fig. 8: (a) Precision, (b) Recall and (c) F1 of individual attacks
in omni-attacks detection.
Dataset I and II are combined and used to train FNN and
LSTM independently. The outputs of both are combined to
form the input features of a multilayer perceptron for training.
After training, FNN, LSTM and FNN-LSTM ensemble IDSs
are integrated into our SCADA testbed to detect and clas-
sify attacks. The traffic is generated online using the script
that generates a pre-determined ratio of normal, temporally
correlated and uncorrelated attacks as described in Fig 2. To
estimate the figures of merits, we evenly divide the predicted
labels to 10 portions and compute the average and standard
deviation of macro-averaged precision, recall and F1. As
shown in Table V, among all the three IDSs, the FNN
achieve lowest performance with macro-averaged figures of
merits of 88±1%, 89.2±0.8% and 87.4±0.6% while LSTM
reaches 99.54±0.03%, 99.01±0.07% and 99.27±0.05%. In
contrast, the FNN-LSTM ensemble IDS further outperforms
both with figures of merits to be 99.76±0.05, 99.57±0.03
and 99.68±0.04. Detailed analysis in Fig. 8 further confirms
that the under-performance of FNN (yellow bars) are due to
the mislabels of temporally correlated attacks (MITM, CRC
and SCAN) while the performance of LSTM (red bars) by
temporally uncorrelated attacks (“Pump Speed (Pump)”, “Tank
1 Level (T1)”, and “Threshold High (H)”, etc.). Overall,
the FNN-LSTM ensemble demonstrates a consistent out-
performance over them in all types of attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we demonstrated that the FNN-LSTM ensem-
ble IDS can detect all types of cyberattacks regardless of the
their temporal relevance. In opposite, FNN only performance
well in temporally uncorrelated attacks and LSTM is relatively
weak in uncorrelated attacks. In future research we will further
improve our model through field trials.
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